


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

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13 April 1967

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Information as of 1600
13 April 1967

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HIGHLIGHTS

The Communists have hit Quang Tri city with mortar fire for the second time this week.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Communist units attacked Quang Tri city again on 13 April, and also severely damaged or destroyed three bridges in the northern provinces of South Vietnam's I Corps (Paras. 1-4). NVA units have been ordered to deploy from the DMZ to Da Nang (Para. 5). Recent reports reveal enemy plans for a rocket and mortar attack against Da Nang Air Base in mid-April (Paras. 6-7).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Constituent Assembly set up new committees to implement its interim legislative powers under the new constitution (Paras. 1-2).

III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.


IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

ANNEX:

South Vietnam Battle Statistics 1963 to week of 2-8 April 1967

- Weapons and Personnel Losses
- Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents



I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Communist military activity on 12-13 April remained focused on the northernmost provinces of I Corps, and included a mortar bombardment of Quang Tri city, the severing of a strategic allied supply route, and several scattered skirmishes with US troops near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

2. The three-hour mortar barrage of 13 April against Quang Tri was the second attack on that provincial capital within a week. The enemy fire did not appear to be directed at any one area of the city; civilian as well as ARVN and US military areas were hit, but only light casualties were reported. Almost simultaneously, two bridges at the southern edge of the city were struck--one was destroyed by an explosive charge and the other was severely damaged by mortar fire.

3. Also early on 13 April, Viet Cong guerrillas destroyed a bridge about eight miles north of Da Nang on Highway 1 which runs northward from Da Nang to key allied installations in Quang Tri Province. The bridge was heavily guarded, but the Viet Cong apparently floated explosives down a river under cover of darkness. Construction of an alternate route has been started, but the movement of supplies can be expected to be impeded until a replacement bridge is built.

4. The Communist forces in the northern provinces are currently expected to expand their aggressive tactics, striking at additional allied fixed installations and lines of communications. The apparent deployment of more North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops into this strategic area also increases the possibility that an all-out effort against at least portions of Quang Tri Province may be impending.

5. NVA units have been given orders to extend their control southward from the DMZ through

13 April 1967

I-1

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Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces as far south as
the Han River near Da Nang

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the NVA 341st Division recently
received these orders at a "political meeting" held
at the division's bivouac area in the DMZ northwest
of Cam Lo.

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Attack Planned Against Da Nang Air Base

6. Several recent reports allege that the Viet Cong are planning a combined mortar and rocket attack in mid-April against the US installation at Da Nang in Quang Nam Province. According to these reports, rocket launchers and possible rocket launch positions were recently observed south and east of the US base. Quantities of ammunition also were observed being carried from Viet Cong supply areas.

7. Although the security of US installations has been improved recently, the relative simplicity of these rocket launchers makes this type of attack quite feasible as the range of this weapon is considerably greater than that of the mortar. The rocket is not as accurate a weapon as are mortars or artillery; however, the barrage effect of a large number of rockets hitting a specific target area can be very effective.

13 April 1967

I-2

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Early this week the Constituent Assembly re-examined its procedural rules and accepted most of them intact. The committee structure was revised to reflect new legislative duties, and a chapter on "legislative procedures" was added.


2. The deputies are scheduled to elect new officers on 14 April, and will then begin debate on the electoral laws. The new committees will draft regulations governing press activities, political party activities, and the organization of the supreme court and inspectorate. The assembly's legislative authority in these areas is in accordance with the chapter in the constitution that regulates the transition to elected government.

13 April 1967


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Weapons Losses







Personnel Losses (Killed only)*



US Casualties to Date: Killed 8,523 Wounded 50,310 Captured 150 Missing 388

*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February 1967, the weekly figure will represent only personnel killed.



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